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Introduction 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is beginning the process 
of planning for the completion of its operations. Winding up the work of internationalized 
courts such as the ECCC involves a number of complex issues that are best addressed 
early in the life of an ad hoc tribunal. Unlike most other completion processes, this one 
takes place under repeated and public threats by Cambodia’s most senior officials to 
abort proceedings for political reasons. 
 
This report outlines considerations for those involved in planning to conclude the 
ECCC’s work while ensuring that it fulfills its core mandate of bringing to justice the 
senior leaders and those most responsible for crimes of the Khmer Rouge. The report 
addresses the cases pending before the ECCC, the goals of a completion plan, and the 
principal options under consideration for completing the court’s work.  
 
The Justice Initiative recommends that, in assembling a completion plan for the ECCC, 
the court’s staff, the UN, and the government of Cambodia should conduct a transparent 
planning process that is open to input from victims’ groups, court monitors, and NGOs, 
among others. Under the current circumstances, as described in this report, the most 
reasonable completion plan for the court should include:  
1. completion by the ECCC—in its current hybrid configuration—of all four cases 
currently before the court; and  
2. immediate preparations to conduct the trials of Case 002 and Cases 003/004 
simultaneously. 
 
In view of the consistently voiced threats of political interference discussed in this report, 
there is currently no reason to believe that, absent a requirement capable of ensuring 
meaningful international engagement, a fully domestic successor court would be capable 
of conducting fair trials or of acting independently and impartially. For this reason, it is 
the position of the Justice Initiative that no cases should be transferred to a Cambodian-
controlled court. However, as some stakeholders have raised the prospect of including in 
the court’s completion plan an option for transferring cases to a Cambodian-controlled 
successor jurisdiction, this report provides an overview of established standards for 
transferring cases from an internationalized tribunal to a domestic tribunal. If this option 
is included in the completion plan, there must be clear rules and standards for such 
transfers. These rules should ensure that the successor court is free of political 
interference and can meet international fair trial standards. The rules should also provide 
for the return of the cases to the ECCC if these standards are not met.  
  
Cases Pending before the ECCC  
There are only four cases—involving a total of ten accused persons—pending before the 
ECCC. The prosecutors have stated that they do not intend to pursue additional accused 
beyond these ten, and the court’s donors have clearly indicated a desire to conclude the 
court’s work without bringing additional cases. For planning purposes, it is therefore 
reasonable to assume the entire caseload of the court will be:  
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Case 001 
The trial of the case against Kaing Guek Eav, alias “Duch” was completed in November 
2009 and a Trial Chamber judgment was issued on July 26, 2010, finding him guilty on 
charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes in connection with his role as head of 
the Tuol Sleng Prison. The defense, prosecution, and several civil party applicants have 
appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court Chamber’s ruling on those appeals is 
expected in early 2011.  
 
Case 002 
This case includes charges of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
domestic law charges against Ieng Sery, Ieng Thirith, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan. 
The trial is expected to begin by the middle of 2011. Although the investigation began in 
July 2007, it was not completed until September 2010 when a closing order and 
indictment were issued by the investigating judges. The indictment is currently under 
appeal to the court’s Pre-Trial Chamber on jurisdictional issues.  
 
Upon conclusion of the appeal, the case will be transferred to the Trial Chamber and a 
trial date set. The trial will likely be lengthy and complicated, as it involves complex 
charges including genocide and liability based on a joint criminal enterprise, against four 
persons alleged to be the most senior living leaders of the Khmer Rouge. These persons 
are all elderly, ranging in age from 78 to 84, and in relatively poor health. They will 
almost certainly be unable to sit through a full day of court and the Trial Chamber may be 
limited to conducting proceedings for only a portion of each trial day to accommodate the 
needs of these elderly accused. Further, proceedings will undoubtedly be stayed for 
varying periods of time throughout the lengthy trial as the Chamber considers motions 
pending before the court or as other complications arise, such as witness availability and 
translation issues. The accused are, to date, denying criminal liability and refusing to 
provide testimony to the court. Forceful and experienced Cambodian and international 
defense counsel represent each accused. Under such circumstances, the trial can 
reasonably be expected to last at least two years, possibly three.  
  
If, optimistically, the trial in Case 002 concludes in late 2013, it is reasonable to expect 
that the Trial Chamber will require at least the first six months of 2014 to complete the 
judgment. The appeal process following a judgment will likely last another six months to 
a year. Under this projected timetable, it will be late 2014 or early 2015 when the court 
completes the Case 002 process. (This projection is less optimistic than that included in 
the court’s Approved Budget for 2010-2011, which projects the completion of any Case 
002 appeals by November 2013.)  
  
Cases 003/004 
These cases include allegations against five suspects whose identities remain 
confidential. After a lengthy process to resolve a disagreement between the international 
and Cambodian prosecutors about whether to submit Cases 003/004 to the investigating 
judges, the cases were finally submitted for formal judicial investigation in September 
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2009.
1
 However, to date it appears that little substantive investigation has been 
conducted, and what has been accomplished has been done without the assistance of 
Cambodian staff. There are widespread concerns that the Cambodian side of the court is 
unwilling and unable to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of these cases. 
These concerns were confirmed in late October when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun 
Sen told UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that “Case 003 will not be allowed...The 
court will try the four senior leaders successfully and then finish with Case 002.”
2
 Hun 
Sen’s comments were the latest and most overt of a series of statements from high-level 
government officials indicating they do not wish Cases 003/004 to go forward.
3
 Such 
blatant political interference in the court’s work is of course contrary to basic fair trial 
standards.
4
 An ECCC official who bows to this political interference violates the Law of 
the Extraordinary Chambers, which requires that judges and prosecutors “shall be 
independent in the performance of their functions, and shall not accept or seek any 
instructions from any government or any other source.”
5
 
  
Although the names of the accused in Cases 003/004 remain confidential, as do the 
crimes and crime sites covered by the prosecutor’s submission, there are indications that 
the accused are considered to be persons “most responsible” for Khmer Rouge crimes 
(e.g., not the “senior leaders” who constitute the Case 002 defendants). As such, the 
asserted crime base and evidence linking the accused to the crime base will likely be 
more direct—and less complex to prove—than in the 002 Case.  
  
For these reasons, the investigation in Cases 003/004 can likely be concluded in much 
less time than that required for Case 002, and any trial could be significantly shorter than 
that anticipated for the 002 Case. While it is conceivable that the investigating judges 
could find that there is no case to be pursued against the suspects named in Cases 
003/004, such a judicial determination falls outside the scope of the completion plan, 
which should assume that the cases will go forward to trial. If investigated efficiently—
                                                 
1
 The names of the accused, the crime base alleged and other details of these cases remains confidential 
under internal rules of the court that provide that the judicial investigation process is generally secret absent 
discretionary decisions by the investigating judges to release information to the public. 
2
 “Hun Sen to Ban Ki-moon: Case 002 last trial at ECCC ,” The Phnom Penh Post, Oct. 27, 2010, 
available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2010102744318/National-news/hun-
sen-sees-pending-krt-as-threat-to-stability.html.  
3
For information on public comments made by senior government officials and evidence of a  lack of 
Cambodian cooperation in the investigation of the cases, refer to the Justice Initiative report, “Recent 
Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: March 2010,” regarding apparent 
political interference in Cases 003/004 at:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/cambo
dia-20100324 (“Justice Initiative Political Interference Report”). 
4
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 of Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976, Article 14(1) “All persons . . . are entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal”.  Similar provisions are in the regional human rights treaties. See also 
European Convention, Article 6(1); American Convention, Articles 8(1) and 27(2); and African Charter, 
Articles 7(1) and 26. 
5
 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, October 27, 2004, Articles 10 and 19, at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (the Law). 
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and with full cooperation between Cambodian and international investigators—the cases 
may well be ready for trial before Case 002 concludes. Although the court’s most recent 
budget request anticipates that any trial for Cases 003/004 will not begin until after the 
conclusion of the Case 002 trial, the court should seriously consider the possibility that, if 
active investigation begins immediately, Cases 003/004 could be tried simultaneously 
with Case 002 and completed on a much shorter timeframe than originally anticipated. 
Possible strategies to accomplish this are examined below.  
 
Goals of the Completion Plan  
The major goal of completion planning is to ensure the court concludes its work as 
efficiently as possible. Where appropriate, a completion plan can also contribute to the 
development of domestic capacity to try cases involving war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
6
 These considerations, however, must be incorporated into a principled 
completion plan that ensures that: a) the court substantially meets its mandate; and b) 
cases before the court are completed in a manner consistent with international standards. 
The plan should strive to ensure that the court leaves Cambodia with a positive model of 
independent and impartial justice and an effective challenge to impunity. 
 
The mandate of the ECCC requires that the court prosecute “senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible” for the crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the court committed between April 17, 1975 and January 6, 1979.
7
 The prosecution of 
only ten persons in connection with the deaths of 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians during the 
Khmer Rouge period is unfortunate, yet understandable given the practical, political, and 
financial difficulties the court faces. In contrast, prosecution of only the five persons the 
government of Cambodia has said it will allow to be prosecuted
8
 would not provide a full 
sense of justice to Cambodians, tell an accurate story of the nature and scope of Khmer 
Rouge crimes, or demonstrate a credible and independent judicial process for Cambodia.
9
 
                                                 
6
 See discussion in Bekou, Olympia, Rule 11 bis: An examination of the Process of Referrals to National 
Courts in ICTY Jurisprudence, 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 723, February 2010; Fausto Poca, “Completion or 
Continuation Strategy? Appraising Problems and Possible Developments in Building the Legacy of the 
ICTY,” Journal of International Criminal Justice, 1 September 2008, ICJ 6 4 (655); and Diane F. 
Orentlicher, “That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia,”  Open Society 
Justice Initiative, July 2010, page 123 et seq.  
7
 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
July 2003, ratified October 19, 2004, at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf , (the 
Agreement), Article 1.  
8 “Hun Sen to Ban Ki-moon: Case 002 last trial at ECCC ,” The Phnom Penh Post, Oct. 27, 2010, 
available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2010102744318/National-news/hun-
sen-sees-pending-krt-as-threat-to-stability.html. See also, Chean Sokha and Robbie Corey-Boulet, 
“ECCC Ruling Risks Unrest: PM,” The Phnom Penh Post, September 8, 2009; Sopheng Cheang, 
“Cambodia PM Accuses Other Countries of Stirring Unrest,” Associated Press, September 10, 2009; and 
Vong Sokheng, “Inquiries could sink ECCC: PM,” The Phnom Penh Post, September 10, 2009; Hun Sen 
speech recorded and broadcast by Voice of America, March 18, 2009; Neth Pheaktra and Georgia Wilkins, 
“Judges should Focus on Current KR Suspects: Gov’t,” The Phnom Penh Post, March 12, 2008; Maggie 
Tait, “Interference 'Deplored' by Judge,” NZPA, April 5, 2009, at 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/2315921/Interference-deplored-by-judge. 
9
 See “A Thousand Voices,” Documentation Center of Cambodia, March 5, 2009, at 
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Most importantly, in view of the repeated, public statements of the Prime Minister 
expressing vehement opposition to cases 003/004, any decision not to pursue these cases 
risks fatally undermining the court’s independence, which is so crucial to public trust.  
 
In addition to the four surviving senior leaders in Case 002, prosecution of Duch as the 
only person in the category of “those who were most responsible” is insufficient to satisfy 
the mandate of the court to provide justice for Cambodians. Duch was found guilty for 
the torture and deaths of over 12,000 detainees in Tuol Sleng Prison, which constitutes 
approximately one percent of those who lost their lives to the Khmer Rouge. Given that 
Duch is widely recognized as amongst those who are “most responsible” for Khmer 
Rouge-era crimes, if those suspected in Cases 003/004 similarly share responsibility for 
the deaths of tens of thousands, and the prosecutor believes there is sufficient evidence 
and reason to pursue them, they should be tried as well.  
 
The need to ensure that the ECCC leaves a positive legacy as a credible judicial 
institution for Cambodians requires that the four cases over which the court currently has 
control are conducted in a manner consistent with international fair trial standards. If any 
of these cases are dismissed, transferred, or otherwise handled in a manner that does not 
evince independent decision making consistent with international standards, the court 
will be left with a legacy of impunity rather than justice in spite of its accomplishments in 
other cases.
10
 
 
Completion Plan Options 
There are several options available to the ECCC in winding up its work. Two options 
under discussion by donors, tribunal officials, the UN, and the government of Cambodia 
are examined below. 
 
1. ECCC Completion of All Pending Proceedings 
The most straightforward option is to allow the ECCC to complete the four cases now 
before it through the completion of any final appeal process. This plan has the best 
chance of ensuring that the court’s mandate is fulfilled with integrity and in accordance 
with international standards. It is also the most expensive option for the court if, as 
contemplated in the current budget, any trial in Cases 003/004 begins only after the 
conclusion of the trial in Case 002. However, alternative trial schedules, including 
simultaneous trials for Cases 002 and 003/004, could, while more costly in the short run, 
ultimately reduce costs and the time required to complete all cases within the current 
ECCC structure. 
 
It is common in other international and hybrid courts for more than one case to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/pdf/A_Thousand_Voices.pdf; and Amnesty International Press 
Release, “Cambodia: Follow Khmer Rouge Convictions with More Prosecutions,” July 26, 2010, available 
at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGPRE012542010&lang=e.  
10
Any finding by the investigating judges or chambers that the cases cannot be pursued should be set forth 
in a well-reasoned decision, and subject to review and public scrutiny. The rules of the court do not 
explicitly provide that an order dismissing cases submitted by the prosecutor be issued publically, but 
shrouding any such decision in secrecy would, after the numerous government statements that have been 
made about the cases, further diminish confidence in the independence of the process.  
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investigated and tried at a time. For instance, the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) regularly schedule a single trial chamber 
to preside over more than one active trial at a time. The chamber either sits for part of the 
day on each case, or staggers trial days for each case within a week or month, depending 
on circumstances. These courts also advance their completion strategies by providing for 
the appointment of ad litem judges to sit on a particular case in order to facilitate the trial 
of more than one case concurrently. Both options should be carefully considered for the 
ECCC. 
 
Scheduling trials for Cases 002 and 003/004 at the same time is practical. As stated 
above, it is unlikely that the Trial Chamber will be able to sit for full days for the 002 trial 
because of the advanced age and poor health of the accused. Accordingly, the court 
should consider running two trials at once, with the 002 Case tried, for instance, in the 
morning and the 003/004 Cases tried in the afternoon. Managing two cases 
simultaneously would place an increased burden on the Trial Chamber and the 
prosecutors’ office, necessitating additional resources. However, the additional expense 
would be justified as a measure to shorten the overall life of the court. Because of delays 
in beginning the investigations, the 003/004 Cases will likely not be ready to begin trial 
until the 002 Case has been underway for at least six months. Under these circumstances, 
scheduling two trials before a single trial chamber or establishing a second trial chamber 
with ad litem judges may be the most effective and efficient way to complete the work of 
the court. Furthermore, there is little appetite for spending tens of millions of dollars per 
year for a court to run a single trial for only a few hours each day. Holding two trials at 
the same time is more efficient, and far better for Cambodians following the trials and 
survivors trekking long distances to observe the court.  
 
 2. Transfer Case 003/004 to a Fully Domestic Trial Chamber or Court 
A second option under consideration by court stakeholders is to eliminate substantial 
international involvement following the completion of Case 002 and to turn over, upon 
conclusion of the investigation, any trial and appeal in Cases 003/004 to either a 
Cambodian domestic court or a fully domestic chamber of the ECCC. The goal of this 
strategy would be to reduce costs by ending most international participation in the court 
before the 003/004 trial takes place. The justifying premise for this approach is that, after 
five or six years of working with international legal professionals, Cambodian legal 
professionals at the court will have gained the capacity and demonstrated the 
independence to conduct the trial without substantial international assistance. But the 
Cambodian government’s continuing (and apparently successful) efforts to politically 
influence the ECCC make it impossible to believe that an entirely Cambodian institution 
could operate independently. 
 
Currently, there is no indication that, on its own, the Cambodian side of the court can or 
will carry out effective and fair trials for atrocity cases. To the contrary, statements of 
high level government officials, including the prime minister, that the Cases 003/004 
should not go forward—combined with the lack of progress in investigating them—
demonstrate that Cambodian officials and staff in the ECCC are unwilling to undertake 
substantive investigations or trials of these cases. The Cambodian government has stated 
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it opposes pursuing prosecutions of Khmer Rouge atrocities beyond the first five brought 
before the ECCC (Cases 001 and 002) because it may cause civil unrest.
11
 Under these 
circumstances, it is perverse to assume that a Cambodian controlled court could or would 
legitimately try Cases 003/004. The UN would fail in its responsibility to uphold 
international fair trial standards for ECCC proceedings if it were to support turning Cases 
003/004 over to a Cambodian court that clearly lacks independence. Similarly, donor 
governments supporting such a step would be in conflict with their own responsibility to 
ensure that all cases are completed in accordance with international standards.  
 
Even if the problem of political interference were to be fully remedied by the government 
of Cambodia and the UN, transfer of the 003/004 Cases to a domestic chamber for trial 
would only be feasible with adequate procedures and protections in place to ensure the 
trials meet full fair trial standards. There are clearly established minimum standards that 
international or hybrid tribunals must adhere to in turning cases over for trial to domestic 
jurisdictions.
12
 These standards require that any successor court has both the political will 
and the practical capacity to try the cases in accord with established standards for fair and 
independent trials. Until such conditions are satisfied, the cases cannot be turned over to 
another judicial body. Further, transfers can only be made if appropriate procedures are 
followed and appropriate protections are in place. In this regard, the experience of the 
ICTY and the ICTR in referring cases to national jurisdictions as part of their completion 
strategies is relevant. Both courts passed similar rules to outline the procedures, 
standards, and protections necessary for such a referral to a domestic court.
13
 Under the 
ICTY and ICTR rules: 
  
• Referrals are made upon the court’s own motion or that of the prosecutor.  
• Referrals are a judicial function and can be made only by a special referral bench of 
judges that would not otherwise sit on the case.  
• The referral bench must be satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial in the 
domestic court. 
• The accused has an opportunity to be heard on the referral issue.  
• The prosecutor has the authority (and the duty) to monitor the referred case.  
• A referral can be revoked if fair trial standards are not being met by the domestic 
court.  
• The accused and the prosecution have the right to appeal decisions of the referral 
bench.  
                                                 
11
 Supra, notes 2 and 3. 
12
 See International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rules of Evidence and Procedure, 
Rule 11 bis, Rev. 44, December 2009, at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev44_en.pdf; and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 11 bis, Revised 
February 19, 2010, at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100209.pdf; and the review of 
ICTY 11 bis cases in Bekou, Olympia, Rule 11 bis: An examination of the Process of Referrals to National 
Courts in ICTY Jurisprudence, 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 723, February 2010. 
13
 ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 11 bis, Rev. 44, December 2009, at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev44_en.pdf and ICTR 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 11 bis, revised February 19, 2010, at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100209.pdf.   
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The ICTY has successfully transferred eight cases involving 13 accused of intermediate 
or lower rank to local and hybrid courts in the former Yugoslavia, after the chambers 
were satisfied that the domestic courts were capable of conducting fair trials.
14
 However, 
the ICTR’s efforts to transfer cases to domestic Rwandan courts have not been successful 
to date. All five cases referred by the prosecutor and considered by the trial chambers of 
the ICTR have been rejected due to concerns about domestic courts’ independence and 
capacity to meet fair trial standards.
15
 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) incorporates somewhat similar safeguards when 
determining if it is appropriate for the court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction 
because a domestic institution is willing and able to investigate and prosecute. According 
to the ICC, handing a case to a domestic institution is not appropriate where “[T]he 
proceedings [in the domestic court] were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”
16
 
In considering how to apply these standards, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC has 
recently said:  
 
Impartiality in the proceedings at hand may be assessed in light of such indicators 
as, inter alia, linkages between the suspected perpetrators and competent authorities 
responsible for investigation, prosecution and/or adjudication of the crimes; public 
statements, awards sanctions, promotions or demotions, deployments, dismissals or 
reprisals in relation to investigative, prosecutorial or judicial personnel concerned. 
Independence in the proceedings at hand may be assessed in light of indicators as, 
inter alia, the alleged involvement of the apparatus of the State, including those 
responsible for law and order, in the commission of the alleged crimes; the extent to 
which appointment and dismissal of investigators, prosecutors and judges affect 
due process in the case; the application of a regime of immunity and jurisdictional 
privileges for alleged perpetrators; political interference in the investigation, 
prosecution and trial; and corruption of investigators, prosecutors and judges.
17
 
                                                 
14
 See Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council, 
Resolution 1534 (2004), UN S/2010/270, June 1, 2010 at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion_strateg
y_01june2010_en.pdf. 
15
 The ICTR has prevented the transfer of several indicted ICTR defendants to Rwandan domestic courts 
because basic fair trial standards could not be met. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, ICTR-97-36-R11bis, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, May 28, 2008; 
Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutors Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, June 6, 2008; Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, June 19, 2008; 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case 
to the Republic of Rwanda, Dec. 16, 2008.  
16
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 17 (2) c at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.  
17
 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 
October 4, 2010, The Hague, Netherlands, Paragraphs 64 and 65.  
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Any principled completion strategy devised by the ECCC that involves the potential to 
transfer Cases 003/004 to a fully domestic trial chamber or court would have to include 
necessary changes to the Agreement, the Law
 
and internal rules that govern the court to 
include standards, protections, and procedures similar to those set forth in Rule 11 bis of 
the ICTY and ICTR, and described by the ICC prosecutor. The ECCC must not violate 
international standards by turning over cases currently within its control to a judicial 
system that has not proven itself up to the task and has indeed shown itself susceptible to 
political interference. For the ECCC to hand over cases to the Cambodian judicial system 
would risk undermining the credibility the court gained with its trial of Duch—a trial that 
by all appearances met international standards. Furthermore, such a hand-over would 
undermine the standards established by the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC and thereby damage 
the cause of international justice and principles of complementarity.  
 
There is no evidence that the problems with independence and capacity in the Cambodian 
judicial system that originally necessitated extensive international participation in the 
ECCC have improved enough to justify international withdrawal from a mass atrocity 
trial. The most recent report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Cambodia, Surya P. Subedi, acknowledges some improvement in the human 
rights and rule of law situation in Cambodia in the last year, but also notes the presence 
of widespread corruption, inadequate judicial capacity, and Cambodians’ lack of 
confidence in the court system.
18
 It is likely that Cambodian officials who have worked at 
the court have gained considerable capacity, but it is not clear they would be involved in 
any domestic chamber or court to which cases were referred or that they could operate 
the court absent the current international assistance and protections. But most critically, 
the overriding problem of political interference means that referred trials would not meet 
international standards. Thus, the Justice Initiative does not regard transferring of ECCC 
cases to a fully domestic chamber for trial or other proceedings to be an option for a 
credible completion plan for the court. 
 
Conclusion  
While there is a practical imperative to plan to wrap up the work of the ECCC, it is vital 
that any completion plan take into account the core mandate of the court and ensure that 
international fair trial standards are met for all cases pending before the court. Ideally, the 
court’s completion will also leave a positive legacy for Cambodia and the progress of 
international criminal justice. We urge the UN, the government of Cambodia, the donors 
of the ECCC, and the ECCC officials to engage in a more transparent discussion of the 
available options for concluding the work of the court. These stakeholders each have a 
considerable investment in the success of the ECCC and must use care not to damage its 
value and credibility by endorsing a completion plan that overvalues the economic need 
to wind up the court above the demands of international standards and the credibility of 
the process. 
 
                                                 
18
 Surya P. Subedi, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human  
Rights in Cambodia,” UN Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/15/46, September 16, 
2010.  
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Critically, if the court ignores the outstanding problems of political interference and 
transfers cases to domestic courts for trial, it diminishes not only the credibility of the 
referred cases but also the confidence in the application of international standards with 
respect to the other cases before the court. It risks the appearance that it is “dumping” the 
cases because it is unwilling or unable to deal with the political interference that has 
come to haunt the ECCC. 
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